

M. W. PELCZAR

## NAMES AS TOKENS AND NAMES AS TOOLS

**ABSTRACT.** After presenting a variety of arguments in support of the idea that ordinary names are indexical, I respond to John Perry's recent arguments against the indexicality of names. I conclude by indicating some connections between the theory of names defended here and Wittgenstein's observations on naming, and suggest that the latter may have been misconstrued in the literature.

### 1. INTRODUCTION

Plainly names can and usually do vary in terms of what literal contents they express across the various contexts in which they get used. The challenge for an indexical account of names is to show that a name is unambiguous – i.e., that it retains a single meaning across a range of uses with respect to which its literal content varies.<sup>1</sup> For only expressions that vary in literal content without varying in meaning count as indexicals.<sup>2</sup>

Orthodoxy has it that the content variability of a name like 'David' or 'Chestertown' is not of the monosemous variety. By way of defending this received view, John Perry begins by observing that

[w]hen a person or thing is assigned a name, a permissive convention is established: that name may be used to designate that person. / ... When a name is used in a conversation or text to refer to a given person, the speaker is exploiting a permissive convention of this sort. A single name like 'David' may be associated with hundreds of thousands of people by different permissive conventions. In the abstract, the problem of knowing which conventions are being exploited when one apprehends a token containing the word 'David' are considerable. ... But usually various factors work to make the use of proper names a practical way of talking about things. I only know a small minority of the Davids that can be designated with 'David'; the ones I know overlap in fairly predictable ways with the ones known by people I regularly meet in various contexts; principles of charity dictate that I take my interlocutors to be designating Davids that might have, or might be taken to have, the properties that are being predicated of the David in question; and I can always just ask.

So far, Perry's observations would seem to lend some intuitive support to the idea that names are indexicals, relying for their contents on such contextual factors as might raise a particular bearer of a name to prominence (in a given context). But Perry continues:



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The role of context in resolving the issues of which naming conventions are being exploited is quite different from its role with indexicals. In the case of indexicals, the meaning of a given expression determines that certain specific contextual relationships to the utterance and utterer – who is speaking, or to whom, or when – determine designation. Different facts are relevant for different indexicals, and the meaning of the indexical determines which. Names don't work like this. The difference between 'David' and 'Harold' is not that they are tied, by their meanings, to different relationships to the utterance or utterer. The role of context is simply to help us narrow down the possibilities for the permissive conventions that are being exploited.

If we have to give this phenomenon a familiar name, it would be "ambiguity." The same name has many different meanings; as with ambiguous expressions, the role of context is to help us determine which meaning is relevant in a given use, rather than to supply a specific type of fact called for by the relevant meaning. There are many differences between the phenomenon in question and what we usually call "ambiguity" however. Paradigm ambiguous expressions have only a few meanings, most of which are known to people who use the expression, or can be easily found by looking in a good dictionary. One can realistically aspire to knowing most of the meanings of many words. Many names have thousands of meanings – that is, there are thousands of individuals that they are used to designate, exploiting various permissive conventions. People who use a given name will be ignorant of the vast majority of its meanings, and it would be silly to aspire to know most of them. For help in discovering or narrowing the possibilities in particular cases one might use a phonebook, or even an encyclopedia, but not a dictionary.

So with names we have ambiguity, not indexicality.<sup>3</sup>

We make a detailed assessment of Perry's arguments against the idea that names are indexicals below, in §2. But it may be worth our while to pause here and ask why, if names really are merely ambiguous, they differ in the ways that Perry indicates from expressions that we normally think of as ambiguous. Why, for example, *doesn't* a good dictionary list up all of the (supposedly) many meanings of a name, given that it is so unstinting in the case of a standardly recognized ambiguous term? Perhaps considerations of material economy and other practical limitations make it unfeasible to include all of the (again, supposedly) many meanings of a name like 'David'; but surely the task is not so daunting when it comes to a name like 'Cleopatra' or 'Willard Van Orman Quine.' Are we to account for the absence of these terms from the O.E.D. as a consequence of their obsolescence or marginality? But this is a book that contains an entry for 'mammothrept.'

The fact that we do not refer to a dictionary but rather rely on contextual cues to ascertain the content of a name in a given utterance lends *prima facie* credibility to the idea that names are not ambiguous, but indexical. This idea receives further intuitive support from the semantics of various "missing link" expressions that occupy a sort of middle-ground between canonical indexicals and names of the most ordinary sort. Consider the expressions 'Dad,' 'Colonel,' and 'Her Ladyship,' for example. The rules

of style dictate that when not used as common nouns (or, in the case of ‘Her Ladyship,’ as a possessive noun phrase), these expressions must be capitalized; this suggests that they should be counted as names. All the same, they behave like indexicals, having their contents fixed in a given context of use by such factors as who is being addressed in that context, the speaker’s relationship to his addressee, and the various demands imposed by Gricean cooperative maxims. Thus if Bill and Mark are brothers, any utterance that Bill directs towards Mark containing the word ‘Dad’ (other than quotationally) will involve a use of ‘Dad’ that expresses a content involving the boys’ father (viz., the function from evaluation points to their father). Or if a soldier addresses a colonel with the word ‘Colonel’, the fact that that officer is his addressee fixes a content for ‘Colonel’, in that use. Had he addressed a different officer of comparable rank, the content of his use of ‘Colonel’ would have differed accordingly. To take one more example, we can imagine a suitor calling at the home of a certain high-ranking noble rich in daughters; supposing the specific object of this hopeful’s affection to be a matter of more or less public knowledge, the Gricean maxim of Relevance would dictate a particular content for ‘Her Ladyship’ in his utterance of the sentence: ‘Is Her Ladyship at home?’

In light of all this, are we to classify expressions like ‘Dad’, ‘Colonel’, and ‘Her Ladyship’ as names, or as indexicals? Clearly the only way to accommodate *all* the intuitions generated by the linguistic evidence is to classify them as both.

The preceding considerations merely lend plausibility to the hypothesis that ordinary names are indexicals; we now turn to arguments aimed at establishing its truth. I present three of these here: one direct argument, and two arguments of a reflective equilibrium nature.

### 1.1. *Direct Argument*

An ambiguous term (such as ‘bill’) exhibits certain intuitive differences from a name (like ‘Bill’) connected with the conditions a speaker must satisfy before he can be properly counted as knowing the (or, as the case may be, one particular) meaning of each. Learning the various meanings that attach to an ambiguous word requires several lessons (one for each meaning), whereas with an unambiguous word only one lesson is required – even though it may be a protracted lesson, and require repeating. This comes out more clearly if we consider what we require of a speaker before we are prepared to grant that he has learned the (or, again, one particular) meaning of a given word. A child might well know the meaning of the word ‘bill’ in its avian anatomical uses, without knowing its meaning in reference to financial paper. But we should not allow his ignorance of

the word's meaning in its financial uses to count against his knowledge of its meaning in its anatomical uses. In this, the case of 'bill' may be contrasted with that of 'Bill'. Having, perhaps, scant knowledge of dental procedure, the child might not know what we mean when we say: "Bill needs a root canal". But if he does learn the meaning of 'root canal', then we should not grant that he knows what 'Bill' means unless he demonstrates an ability to comprehend the meaning of a wide range of sentences in which it occurs, including the sentence: 'Bill needs a root canal'. Or, again: the only circumstances under which we would not count it against someone's knowledge of the meaning of 'Bill' that he did not know the meaning of the sentence, 'Bill is a talented actor' would be if he did not know the meaning of one or more of the words accompanying 'Bill' in that sentence. If someone were to say: "I know what an actor is and all that, but I just can't attach any meaning to the sentence: 'Bill is a talented actor'" we would not count him as knowing the meaning of the name 'Bill' – of being a competent user of the name. Yet if the name were ambiguous as between its uses in sentences like 'Bill needs a root canal' and 'Bill is a talented actor' – assuming the content of 'Bill' to be different in each, now – we should not count it against someone's knowledge of the (or, on this untenable view, one particular) meaning of the name, that he could understand only a limited range of sentences containing only it and other expressions whose meanings he knew. This leads us to conclude that unlike 'bill', 'Bill' is unambiguous, for all its content variability.

Let me emphasize that the preceding argument is conducted in terms of a speaker's knowledge of the meanings (i.e., in a Kaplanian framework, the characters)<sup>4</sup> of sentences, and not their contents. We do not require a speaker to know the content of 'It snowed yesterday' relative to any use in order to know its meaning. The fact that a speaker does not know the content of a given utterance of, e.g., 'Bill needs a root canal' alone gives us no more reason to doubt his knowledge of the meaning of that sentence. Thus, in making knowledge of the meaning of 'Bill' conditional upon knowledge of the meaning of any sentence containing it (and no (other) expression of unknown meaning to the speaker), we are really requiring very little. The point is that if 'Bill' were merely ambiguous, we would not be in a position to require even this much.

### 1.2. *Reflective Equilibrium Arguments*

In this section I offer arguments to the effect that the indexical theory of names yields attractive solutions to a number of main problems confronting the general position that names are "directly referring" expressions (as opposed to, e.g., abbreviated definite descriptions). One of these prob-

lems has to do with the way that some names undergo shifts of reference; another relates to the behavior of names within attitudinative sentential contexts. I consider the indexical theory of names in relation to each of these problems, in turn.

### 1.2.1. *The Problem of Reference Shift*

In his essay on the causal theory of names, Gareth Evans presents a cogent criticism of Kripke's account of name reference.<sup>5</sup> According to this account, names refer to their bearers by virtue of relating to them through a chain of events, beginning with an initial "baptism" or dubbing of the referent with the name, then proceeding through a series of transmissions of the name from one speaker to another (each satisfying the condition that the speaker to whom the name is transmitted intends to use it to refer to the same thing as the transmitting speaker), and terminating in a given use of the name. Evans's criticism is that this account leaves no room for certain actually observed cases in which a name undergoes a shift in reference over time. He makes the point with the help of the name 'Madagascar', which began life referring to a certain portion of the African mainland, but over time came to refer to the island now familiarly known by that name:

Change of denotation is . . . decisive against the [unadorned] Causal Theory of Names. Not only are changes of denotation imaginable, but it appears that they actually occur. We learn from Isaac Taylor's book: *Names and their History*, 1898:

In the case of 'Madagascar' a hearsay report of Malay or Arab sailors misunderstood by Marco Polo . . . has had the effect of transferring a corrupt form of the name of a portion of the African mainland to the great African Island.

A simple imaginary case would be this: Two babies are born, and their mothers bestow names upon them. A nurse inadvertently switches them and the error is never discovered. It will henceforth be the case that the man universally known as 'Jack' is so called because a woman dubbed some other baby with the name.<sup>6</sup>

The problem that Evans points out does not pertain merely to a smattering of seemingly unusual cases (such as that of 'Madagascar'), but goes to the core of the (unadorned) causal theory of names. Without some way of allowing for a certain responsiveness of name-reference to the broader intentions of the speakers who actually use a name at a given time, it remains a live possibility under Kripke's account that by 'London' we could all today be referring to Paris, or to something that is not a geographical entity at all (and perhaps does not even exist anymore). All that would be required for this to be so would be for someone at the beginning of the chain by means of which this name has been passed down to us to have dubbed something other than London 'London.' Had that happened – and how do we know that it did not? – subsequent generations of speakers' intentions could by Kripke's account do nothing to change the fact

that by ‘London’, we refer to something distinct from the English capital. The same point can be made concerning any name (including one’s own); hence in its unadorned version, the causal theory of names fails, implying as it does the epistemic possibility of states of affairs that we know very well not to obtain.

Treating names as indexicals leads to a natural solution to the problem that Evans points out. The key notion connected with the indexicality of names is that of a dubbing in force. A dubbing (or denomination) is simply an act (or series of acts) whereby a name is conferred upon something; a dubbing  $\delta$  is “in force” in a given context just in case it is possible for a speaker in that context to exploit  $\delta$ , so as to refer to the thing dubbed in  $\delta$ . Intuitively: a dubbing that involves conferring a name  $\epsilon$  upon a thing,  $x$ , is in force relative to a given context, just in case it would be true to say in that context that  $x$  is called  $\epsilon$ . The factors that determine whether a given dubbing is in force in a given context are many and varied (for some of the details, see Pelczar and Rainsbury 1998); but this bare outline is enough to give an idea of how viewing names as dubbings-sensitive indexicals explains the possibility of Evans-style reference shift. In the Madagascar case, various facts of usage over a certain period of time cause the dubbing of a certain region of mainland Africa ‘Madagascar’ to lose force, in favor of a dubbing (by the same name) of the familiar African island. In the baby switch scenario, the dubbing of the baby ‘Jack’ loses force much more quickly; here, it is a Gricean conversational maxim of truth-telling that probably causes this dubbing to lose force in favor of an alternative *de facto* dubbing of another child by the name ‘Jack’. As these cases suggest, a dubbing can lose force owing to covert contextual factors, without the need for an explicit statement to the effect that a given name is no longer to refer to a certain thing. Something similar happens at a more local level with suppositions: an act of supposing something to be true can go out of effect or lose force without being explicitly counteracted by an overt statement to the effect that the supposition has been discharged. Thus, just as a supposition made in the course of conversation may quietly become inoperative, perhaps to be replaced by an alternative supposition, so over a longer stretch of time (or, series of conversations) might the prior denomination of a given individual by the name  $\epsilon$  quietly recede to make way for an alternative prior denomination of some distinct individual by the same name.<sup>7</sup>

The notion of a dubbing in force provides a way of refining Kripke’s causal theory of names so as to accommodate Evans’s observations concerning a name like ‘Madagascar’. If someone today happens to have learned this name as part of a chain of events originating with the de-

nomination of a portion of the African mainland, we need not take that to imply that he uses the name to refer to that portion of Africa, as opposed to the island of Madagascar. This is because the causal-intentional route by which he acquired the name constitutes at most one of the elements that may give force to one of the relevant dubbings (i.e., of the mainland versus the island by 'Madagascar'). Other factors (such as conversational norms of relevance and truth-telling) can also and in this case do have a bearing on which of the relevant dubbings is in force in a given utterance of 'Madagascar' by our hypothetical contemporary speaker. And we needn't posit any explicit act by which (or identify a precise moment at which) the dubbing of the island acquired force in lieu of that of the mainland territory, any more than such an act or moment need to be identified in explaining the loss or acquisition of force by a supposition.

It would be possible for a proponent of Kripke's theory to avail himself of the notion of dubbings in force to solve the problem of reference shift, without taking the additional step of treating names as indexicals. That is, one could take the line that shifts of name reference always issue in shifts of meaning; that, for example, in Evans's baby switch scenario, the name 'Jack' is ambiguous as between a grown man of that name and another who no one realizes was ever dubbed thus. Likewise one would have to maintain that 'Madagascar' actually is ambiguous, in one sense designating the island familiarly known by that name, and in another a region of mainland Africa. These conclusions seem hard to countenance: surely it would be a mistake to hold that a certain region of the African mainland is today called 'Madagascar'. This, combined with the positive considerations that we have already reviewed in favor of treating names as indexicals, makes it much more natural to take dubbings in force as the basis for an indexical account of names – an account with the resources to meet objections to direct reference theories on the score of reference shift.

### 1.2.2. *Attitudinative Puzzles*

The utility of the indexical theory of names in solving various problems posed for direct reference theory by attitudinative puzzles has been argued for at length elsewhere<sup>8</sup>; here I only review these results briefly.

An important respect in which descriptivist accounts of naming seem to have an edge over accounts that accord names the status of rigid designators is that the former, but not the latter, yield obvious solutions to a certain kind of puzzle created by the possibility for an individual to bear conflicting attitudes towards a single fact. Such for example happens in the case of the ancient astronomer who believed that Hesperus was in the sky, but would have denied that Phosphorus was in the sky ('Hesperus'

and ‘Phosphorous’ both being names of Venus, corresponding to the better known designations, ‘the Morning Star’ and ‘the Evening Star’). Under descriptivism, it is easy to explain how the astronomer could get into this situation. It is simply a matter of his using ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ as abbreviations for distinct descriptions; say, ‘the last celestial body to disappear in the morning during summer’ and ‘the first celestial body to appear in the evening during winter’, respectively.<sup>9</sup> Thus it is no more puzzling that he could assent to an assertion of the sentence, ‘Hesperus is shining’ while denying an assertion of ‘Phosphorous is shining’ than that one could assent to ‘The richest man alive wears glasses’ while denying ‘The chairman of Microsoft wears glasses’. In particular, in neither case is one forced to posit some ignorance on the part of the individual concerned regarding the meaning of one or more of the terms figuring in his assertion (or, denial).

Unlike descriptivism, the direct reference theory of names seems incapable of explaining the sorts of attitudinative scenarios glossed above as cases of simple factual error. Consequently, direct reference theory must find a new way of explaining how such scenarios can arise, without positing some linguistic incompetence on the part of the agents figuring in them. Many solutions to the problem have been attempted, but the indexical theory of names affords a uniquely simple solution. What accounts for the possibility of an individual who is linguistically fully competent – and in particular, competent to use and understand the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ – to bear incompatible attitudes towards the sentences ‘Hesperus is shining’ and ‘Phosphorus is shining’ is that as in the case of any indexical, knowing the meaning of a name does not require knowing what it refers to in any given context. In a way, this solution of the problem parallels the descriptivist one; only, instead of comparing the sentences ‘Hesperus is shining’ and ‘Phosphorus is shining’ to the sentences, ‘The richest man alive wears glasses’ and ‘The chairman of Microsoft wears glasses’, the indexical solution points to a comparison with the sentences, ‘I look foolish’ and ‘He looks foolish’, where ‘I’ and ‘he’ refer to the same individual. The advantage of this approach over the descriptivist solution is that it preserves the hard-won insight that names designate rigidly (just as do ordinary indexicals, like ‘I’ and ‘he’). This, then, is a further benefit we reap from adopting the view that names are not ambiguous, but indexical.

## 2. PERRY’S OBJECTIONS

So far we have considered a variety of arguments for the monosemy (and hence, indexicality) of names. But we have yet to confront Perry’s ar-



guments for the opposite claim, that names are merely ambiguous. I say “arguments”, although to the naked eye Perry offers just one argument against the indexicality of names, which goes succinctly as follows: the literal content of an indexical varies in accordance with “certain specific contextual relationships” determined by its meaning; the content variability of a name is not of this regimented sort; hence, names are not indexicals. Under closer scrutiny, however, Perry’s line of reasoning resolves itself into several distinct arguments (or at least admits of several construals), which I shall consider in turn.

### 2.1. *Lack of Specificity*

One way to understand Perry’s objection is as follows. An indexical, such as ‘here’ or ‘yesterday’, has its contents determined (in various contexts of utterance) by a relationship or rule that is “specific” in the sense that it is peculiar to that indexical, determining contents for that indexical alone and no others besides. For example, in any context<sup>10</sup> ‘here’ has its content determined by the rule correlating with each context a function from evaluation points (possible worlds, world-time pairs, or whatever) to a certain location.<sup>11</sup> By contrast, ‘yesterday’ has its content in a given context determined by a rule that correlates with each context a function from evaluation points to a certain day (the day prior to that of the given context of utterance). Each of these rules is specific to the indexical that it governs: we can’t use the rule for ‘here’ to determine contents for ‘yesterday,’ and we can’t use the rule for ‘yesterday’ to determine contents for ‘here.’

By contrast (this objection continues), to the extent that there is a rule that determines the content of a name relative to an arbitrary context of use, this will be the *same* rule in the case of every name; viz., some such rule as: the content of a name,  $\epsilon$ , in a given context  $c$  is the function from evaluation points to the individual dubbed  $\epsilon$  in the dubbing that is in force in  $c$ .<sup>12</sup> But we can use this rule to determine the content of *any* name, relative to any given context. Hence the rule lacks the sort of specificity exhibited by the content determining rules that govern indexicals like ‘here’ and ‘yesterday.’ To put the objection one way: the content determining rule governing a name corresponds not to a specific (indexical) expression, but to an entire part of speech (the semantic category of names).

In assessing this objection, it will be helpful to state the content determining rules that govern various expressions in a slightly crisper fashion. Thus, letting  $\epsilon$  range over names, and  $c$  range over contexts of utterance,

and using ‘ $\mathcal{C}(x, y)$ ’ as shorthand for ‘the content of expression  $x$  with respect to context  $y$ ’, we have the following rule for names [I]:

$$(\forall \epsilon, c) \mathcal{C}(\epsilon, c) = \{ \langle x_1, x_2 \rangle : x_1 \text{ is an evaluation point \& } x_2 = \text{that which is dubbed } \epsilon \text{ in the dubbing that is in force relative to } \epsilon \text{ in } c \}.$$

As noted already, this rule determines a content for an arbitrary name relative to any context of use. But from this it does not follow that there are not, in addition, “specific relations of contextual determination” for individual names – i.e., a *variety* of distinct content-determining rules, one per name. And of course there are: the various instantiations of [I], relative to the variable  $\epsilon$ . But maybe the idea behind Perry’s objection is supposed to be that unlike with names, there is no *uniform* rule, in the case of (standard) indexicals – i.e., that no two indexicals are such that something like [I] can be formulated with respect to them (i.e., a (true) generalization, at least two instantiations of which are “specific” rules for determining the contents of each of those indexicals, respectively).

Let  $\tau$  range over the terms ‘this’ and ‘that’,  $c$  range as before over contexts, and  $c_A$  stand for the speaker in context  $c$ . Then we have the following rule, [II], which determines contents for both ‘this’ and ‘that’, relative to an arbitrary context of use:<sup>13</sup>

$$(\forall \tau, c) \mathcal{C}(\tau, c) = \{ \langle x_1, x_2 \rangle : x_1 \text{ is an evaluation point \& } x_2 = \text{that which } c_A \text{ manifestly intends to speak of in uttering } \tau \}.$$

One instantiation of [II] yields a rule that determines contents for ‘this’ but not ‘that’:

$$(\forall c) \mathcal{C}(\text{‘this’}, c) = \{ \langle x_1, x_2 \rangle : x_1 \text{ is an evaluation point \& } x_2 = \text{that which } c_A \text{ manifestly intends to speak of in uttering ‘this’} \}.$$

– while a different instantiation yields a rule determining contents for ‘that’, but not ‘this’:

$$(\forall c) \mathcal{C}(\text{‘that’}, c) = \{ \langle x_1, x_2 \rangle : x_1 \text{ is an evaluation point \& } x_2 = \text{that which } c_A \text{ manifestly intends to speak of in uttering ‘that’} \}.$$

Since ‘this’ and ‘that’ bear the same relation to [II] as various names bear to [I], the fact that names bear this relation to this general kind of content determining rule does not call into question their status as indexicals (for, ‘this’ and ‘that’ are clearly indexicals).<sup>14</sup>

It may be thought that [I] and [II] differ in the following (perhaps important) respect: whereas the occurrence of the bound variable  $\epsilon$  on the right hand side of the equivalence in [I] is ineliminable, the similar

occurrence of  $\tau$  in [II] is merely gratuitous. But this is not so: the occurrence of the expression variable on the right hand side of the equivalence in [II] is as essential as the similar occurrence of  $\epsilon$  in [I]. Consider the following sentence, supposing ‘this’ and ‘that’ to refer to different things in the context in which it is uttered:

‘This is a knife, and that is a letter-opener.’

In uttering this sentence under the described circumstances, there are two things that the speaker manifestly intends to talk about. If we were to eliminate the occurrence of  $\tau$  from the right hand side of the equivalence in [II], we would therefore be left with a rule that failed to determine a content for either ‘this’ or ‘that’ in occurrences such as this. As it stands, however, [II] does determine a content for each of these demonstratives, even here: although there are two things to which the speaker manifestly intends to refer in the context we are considering, there is only one that he intends to talk about in uttering ‘this’ (or, ‘that’) – and analogous considerations apply to other indexicals, such as ‘he’ and ‘she.’<sup>15</sup>

## 2.2. *Messiness*

So far, our consideration of Perry’s objections has failed to uncover a telling difference between ordinary names and indexicals. Now we consider a different construal of Perry’s remarks, which for lack of a better title I shall call “the messiness objection.” This is the objection that the contextual relationships that determine contents for an ordinary name are so complex that they do not give the use of a name the sort of uniformity or cohesion required for indexicality. To be sure, one can supply a veneer of simplicity with such formulations as [I] and its individual corollaries for specific names. But this veneer covers an immense complexity that is simply gestured at by appeal to “dubbings in force.” Any effort to state precisely the conditions under which a given dubbing of a thing with a particular name is in force (in any context) quickly leads to the consideration of multifarious factors, semantic, pragmatic, and even extra-linguistic, that, to say the least, resist tidy encapsulation. By contrast, the rule that determines contents for, e.g., ‘yesterday’ is quite straightforward: relative to an arbitrary context, the content of ‘yesterday’ is the function from evaluation points to the day prior to that on which that context occurs. Period.

It cannot be denied that the factors that go into the contextual determination of a particular content for a name are typically complicated, and sometimes enormously so.<sup>16</sup> The problem with the objection is its assumption that such complication is never in evidence in the case of a standardly

recognized indexical; that to count as an indexical, an expression of variable content must have its content vary in accordance with a “tidy” (as opposed to messy) rule.

It is true that the indexical ‘yesterday’ and various others like it have their contents determined by tidy rules, such as the one cited above. But with other indexicals this is not so. Consider, for example, the indexical ‘here.’ As in the case of a name, it is possible to give a rule that determines contents for ‘here’ relative to an arbitrary context of use: with respect to any context, the content of ‘here’ is the function from evaluation points to the location in which that context takes place. However, also as in the case of an ordinary name, this rule papers over an enormous amount of complexity. In this case it is the appeal to “location” that serves as the rug under which the messiness is swept. Let me explain.

A classic account of the semantics of ‘here’ is the one provided by David Kaplan as part of his “logic of demonstratives.”<sup>17</sup> Minus the technical trappings, this account holds that relative to any literal use, ‘here’ has for its content a function from contexts of evaluation to positions in three-dimensional space.<sup>18</sup> What content ‘here’ expresses relative to an arbitrary use is thought of as being completely determined by a rule that associates with each context of use a particular function from evaluation points to positions.

Little is said as to the nature of these “positions”, or concerning how ‘here’ comes to refer to a particular one of them in this or that context. On an unsympathetic construal, the idea might be that a position is merely a geometrical point, perhaps determined by the center of gravity of whoever utters the word ‘here’ in this or that context of use. But of course, when a mover instructs some of his underlings: “put the piano here”, he does not tell them to place it at his own center of gravity (whatever that could mean). Yet neither will it do to construe positions as regions of space – perhaps determined by spheres of a certain radius containing the individuals using ‘here’ in given contexts. It is surely not the intent of a surgeon to express such a content when he says, *in medias operatio*, “Place a clamp here”.

One might think that the difficulties raised by these examples could be overcome by appeal to pragmatic considerations; i.e., by an account that tries to explain the apparent qualitative diversity of contents that ‘here’ can express as the product of implicature.<sup>19</sup> However, if the proposition that the piano be placed at his own center of gravity really were the literal content of the mover’s utterance, and if the content his interlocutors act on is merely implicated, then his interlocutors would respond the same way were he to say ‘Put the piano at my center of gravity.’ We may be fairly certain that they would not. Similar problems confront us if we construe

the literal content of 'here' to be in every use a function from evaluation points to the environs of contexts of use. Let us sincerely hope that our surgeon expressed no such content when he said, 'Place a clamp here.' Again, we can reassure ourselves with the reflection that if the doctor were to say 'Place a clamp within ten feet of me', or even just: 'Place a clamp in my vicinity', he would elicit a quite different response from what he would elicit by uttering simply: 'Place a clamp here'.

These cases strongly suggest that the salient contents of 'here' with respect to the uses we are considering are not implicated, but literal. It is true that cointensional utterances may not in every case be substituted to yield the same implicative effect. But such cases arise only where the implicatum in question is generated at least partly by Gricean maxims of Manner pertaining to the wording of an utterance (as opposed to its content). Examples of such maxims are Brevity, Apt Reference, and Faithfulness. But such maxims as these obviously have no part in the cases we have been considering. Absent the discovery of "wording"-type maxims capable of generating the understood contents of common uses of 'here' as implicata in the way this whole approach requires, we may conclude that to the extent that Gricean rules come into the picture at all essentially, it is as helping to determine a literal content for 'here', in certain contexts of use.<sup>20</sup>

So, these cases and the many similar ones that it is possible to think of show that the various specific contents that we use a word like 'here' to convey are not as a rule merely implicated contents, but ones that the expression literally expresses. The apparent complexity in how this indexical has its contents determined in various contexts is therefore not to be written off as a pragmatic side show; the untidiness we find in the use of 'here' is semantic, not pragmatic. This means that the Kaplanian rule for 'here' completely determines contents for it relative to any context of use only at the expense of building all this complexity into the notion of "position of context" – just as the complexity pertaining to a name gets built into the notion of a dubbing in force, in [I] and its corollaries.

A different attempt to formulate a tidy semantics for 'here' involves appeal to the notion of contextual salience. This approach offers the following rule for determining contents for 'here': relative to an arbitrary context of utterance, the content of 'here' is the function from evaluation points to the salient location of that context. Against the objection that such an appeal to "salience" introduces an unacceptable level of vagueness into the semantic theory, it might be replied that the semantic rule that determines contents for 'yesterday' does not instruct us how we are, in a given case, to determine *which* day is the day prior to the day of a given

context of utterance – but the semantics of ‘yesterday’ are tidy, for all that. Thus it would be unreasonable to expect a tidy rule for ‘here’ to instruct us how we are, with respect to any given context, to determine which location is the salient one, in that context.

Whether or not we should be satisfied with this response, there is another consideration that shows that the rule in terms of salience does not yield a tidy semantics for ‘here.’ The objection I have in mind parallels one that various philosophers working on the topic of free will and determinism have raised, against the claim that an individual acts only on his strongest desires. It is objected that this claim is either false, or else vacuously true. If it is sufficient for a given desire’s being the strongest (for a given individual, regarding a given choice) that it is the one that that individual ends up acting on, then of course one acts only on one’s strongest desires. But given this conception of strength of desire, the claim that one acts only on one’s strongest desires is true merely for the same reason that it is true that one acts only on those desires upon which one acts. On the other hand, if we are to characterize strength of desire in a way that does not trivialize the claim that one acts only on one’s strongest desires, we shall find it difficult to do so in a way that makes that claim come out true. Ordinarily, what we mean by speaking of the relative strengths of our desires has to do with the psychical or appetitive urges that we experience in attempting to satisfy or overcome them. But given such a characterization of strength of desire, it seems false that one acts only on one’s strongest desires. For example, it seems false that in refraining from smoking a cigarette, an addict satisfies his strongest desire, if in fact he had to resist a tremendous urge to smoke not counterbalanced by any corresponding urge (as opposed to mere rational preference) not to smoke.

The situation is similar with regard to the proposed appeal to contextual salience. Certainly an utterance of ‘here’ in a given context refers to whichever location is salient in that context – if being the location to which ‘here’ refers in that context is sufficient for salience (in that context). But if that is the conception of salience we are working with, the proposed rule for ‘here’ constitutes only a trivial or vacuous specification of which of its potential contents the term ‘here’ expresses, relative to a given context.

On the other hand, we might try to employ a more natural conception of salience that does not lead to this result. But any sense of ‘salient’ in which it is true that ‘here’ always refers to the contextually salient location is bound to be a very complicated one. To see why, consider the following conversation, taking place at the home of the President of Smalltown

College during a reception for a visiting speaker (who has just presented a paper before the Department of Philosophy):

President: I enjoyed your talk.

Speaker: Thanks, it's always a pleasure to visit Smalltown.

President: Oh, here is Jacob Bunce; let me introduce you.

Speaker: Why Jake! I didn't know that you were here now.

Bunce: I just started this fall.

In this conversation, the first occurrence of 'here' refers to the President's immediate vicinity, whereas in its second occurrence, 'here' refers to the Smalltown College community. A salience-based semantics for 'here' will therefore have to employ the term 'salient' in a sense in which these are the salient locations, relative to each of these utterances of the term, taken respectively. And it will not do to employ 'salient' in a sense in which the salient location of a context is whatever location makes the statement in which 'here' is used true (supposing it to be used to make a statement). For one thing, in this sense of 'salient', the salience-based semantics would make it difficult or perhaps impossible to say anything false by means of the term 'here.' For another, there will typically be many truth-making interpretations for 'here', relative to a given use of the term (e.g., the President's statement comes out true if we take his use of 'here' to refer to the planet Earth). At a minimum, therefore, the proposed account would have to be tailored to overcome these problems. Whether there is any sense of 'salient' capable of accommodating all the required modifications is not a question I shall try to answer. The important point for present purposes is simply that if there is such a sense, it must be a complicated one. So the rule for 'here' in terms of salience is at bottom no tidier than the rules for ordinary names, formulated earlier.

Before moving on, we should consider one more effort to show that an indexical like 'here', unlike a name, really does get its content determined by a tidy rule. This effort focusses on speakers' intentions, offering the following rule as a (tidy) determiner of contents for 'here', relative to an arbitrary context: the content of 'here' with respect to any context is the function from evaluation points to the location to which the speaker of that context intends to refer, in uttering 'here' therein.

The proposed rule fails, for reasons related to those accounting for the failure of similar rules for demonstratives like 'that' and 'these.'<sup>21</sup> Suppose I have hired you to make an appraisal of my book collection and, standing surrounded by books in my library I say to you: "My books are all here". In this context, 'here' expresses some such content as, "in this room". This is so even if my intention is to assert the proposition that all my books are

in the United States; speaker's intention does not as it were trump every other contextual factor in determining a complete content for 'here'.

It may seem that a simple emendation of the proposed rule would overcome these problems. Here is the emended rule: the content of 'here' relative to any given context is the function from evaluation points to the location that it is reasonable to presume the speaker of that context to intend to refer to, therein. This seems to handle cases such as the book appraisal scenario: regardless of what I *intended* to refer to in uttering 'here' in that case, it seems that the only location that it is *reasonable* to presume that I was referring to was my library.

It may well be that this (emended) rule in terms of speaker intention correctly determines contents for 'here' relative to any context of use. However, as before, the *tidiness* of the rule is an illusion.

What it is reasonable for one to presume depends on the information that one has. Of course, if you have too little information (e.g., don't know much of anything about the context of utterance – you've been kidnapped, and blindfolded and transported, and overhear your captors saying, "Let's stop here"), or if you have false information, you will probably get the content wrong. But there is also a danger posed by the possibility of having *too much* information. For example, if for some reason you *know* that the speaker has a certain non-standard intention in uttering the word (as occurs in cases of "inside jokes", for example), the content that it will be reasonable for you to presume the speaker intends to express by means of his use of, e.g., 'here' will differ from the content that his use of it actually (literally) expresses. So, at the very least, the proposed content-determining rule presupposes an account of what kind of individual is to be used as the yardstick for reasonable presumption (and a "qualified individual" had better not be defined as one who does a good job at guessing which content the term literally expresses). I do not claim that such an account cannot be given. Maybe it can. The point is that it is going to be complicated – no less messy than a full and true account of the dynamics of dubbings in force.<sup>22</sup>

### 2.3. Underdetermination

We have found no difference of messiness or complexity between the use of ordinary names and many of the most common indexicals. I now turn to a final reconstruction of Perry's argument against the indexical theory of names. This is suggested by his remark that in the case of names (unlike that of indexicals), "[t]he role of context is simply to help us narrow down the possibilities for the permissive conventions that are being exploited" to refer to a given thing. The idea here seems to be that a rule derived from [I] for a particular name typically *underdetermines* that name's content, in the



contexts in which it is uttered. By contrast, the (similar) rules governing standardly recognized indexicals determine contents for them fully, with respect to each context.

Once more, in attempting to counter the objection, I shall concede the point with regard to names, but call in question the suggestion that all commonly recognized indexicals differ from names in the respect indicated. But first we must clarify the sense in which the rules we have proposed “underdetermine” contents for names, relative to various contexts.<sup>23</sup>

There is a sense in which every expression (including every expression of variable content) has its content “fully determined” by a rule. Every expression is such that there exists a function from contexts to contents, correlating with each context the content that that expression does (or would) express, in that context. In some cases this function may be difficult or perhaps even humanly impossible to state with precision, whereas in others a precise formulation is relatively easy (such as in the case of an indexical like ‘yesterday’, and many content-invariant expressions). These differences however correspond to the distinction between terms that admit of “messy” versus “tidy” semantic treatment, and we have already seen that this distinction does not discriminate between names and many ordinary indexicals.

A different distinction focuses not on the degree of precision with which this mathematically guaranteed kind of determination of contents can be specified (in the case of various expressions), but on another kind of determination altogether. For, in one sense, a rule may be said to “determine” a content for a given expression in a given use, just in case it leaves no discretion to the individual using it over what to express by its means, on the occasion of that use. Such for example is the rule governing the literal use of ‘yesterday.’ No one has any discretion over what literally to express by means of this word, on any occasion on which he uses it: relative to any context of use, the content of ‘yesterday’ is rule-bound to be a certain function from evaluation points to a particular day.

By contrast, speakers do seem to exercise a certain amount of discretion over what literally to express by means of an ordinary name, in at least some contexts. This discretion is seldom unlimited, of course; *pace* Humpty Dumpty, there are ordinarily various constraints on what one may express by means of a given name, in any context.<sup>24</sup> In the case of certain names, the element of discretion may amount to almost nothing; this is true of especially unusual and well-known names, for example. Except in the case of an initial baptism, one does not (nowadays) have much discretion over whom to refer to by means of the name ‘Willard Van Orman Quine.’ But in less unusual cases, speaker discretion is more in evidence. Perry

brings this point out in his discussion of the name 'David.' He observes that if he is unsure as to which of a number of individuals his interlocutor is referring to in uttering 'David', he can "always just ask". What is more (and what Perry seems to be getting at in the remark with which we began this section), it appears that in some cases, one *must* have recourse to "asking", in order to figure out which "permissive convention" the speaker is exploiting (or (if this is different), which dubbing is in force). That is, it sometimes happens that there is a plurality of individuals each of whom a speaker may with equal reason be supposed by his audience to be referring to; in such situations, the only thing that decides which of these candidates is the actual referent of 'David' (in the context in question) is the speaker's intention (in using the name on that occasion). But this means that no rule can fully determine contents for a name like 'David' in all contexts in the sense of 'determine' at issue: the content of such a name is underdetermined by the relevant corollary of [I], inasmuch as this rule does not – and if it is correct, cannot – eliminate the element of speaker discretion (as for example does the rule that determines contents for 'yesterday').

But while these considerations certainly point to a basic difference between the semantics of ordinary names and the semantics of an indexical like 'yesterday', they fail to indicate an essential difference between names and other run-of-the-mill indexicals. The demonstrative 'that' serves as a case in point. It seems clear that any adequate semantics for this term must assign a role to speakers' intentions in using it. This is not to say that such intentions are the only – or even the predominant – factor in fixing contents for 'that', in various contexts. We know that a speaker's intentions in uttering 'that' can be overridden by other contextual factors, that fix a content for the demonstrative distinct from that which the speaker intends.<sup>25</sup> But speakers' intentions often do have at least some bearing on what the content of 'that' is, in a particular context, and sometimes a decisive one. At a minimum, there are cases analogous to the one considered earlier involving the name 'David', in which a speaker's use of 'that' is such that there is a plurality of things that he might reasonably be taken to be referring to by it; in such cases, the speaker's intention is the final arbiter of content.

Many indexicals resemble 'that' in relying for their contents in at least some contexts at least partly on speakers' intentions; for example, in light of earlier observations, it seems likely that 'here' sometimes depends for its content on the intentions of its utterer.<sup>26</sup> Since all such indexicals resemble names in essentially incorporating an element of speaker discretion into their literal uses (and hence in having their contents "underdetermined", in

the relevant sense), we do not have here the makings of a telling objection to the view that names are indexical.<sup>27</sup>

### 3. CONCLUSION

By way of conclusion, I would like to suggest some connections between the account of names defended here and Wittgenstein's remarks on naming. In a well-known discussion of *Philosophical Investigations* §79, Saul Kripke ascribes to Wittgenstein a "cluster of descriptions" theory of names, roughly according to which a name refers to whatever instantiates a "weighted most" of a certain aggregate of properties associated with it.<sup>28</sup> Such a theory is one of several descriptivist approaches to the semantics of names that Kripke demonstrates to be inadequate, and in particular, inferior to an account that accords names the status of rigid designators.

It seems clear that Wittgenstein espouses a descriptivist account of names. Descriptivism, however, is compatible with an account of names as indexicals, and it seems to me that semanticists have discarded the baby with the bath-water in rejecting Wittgenstein's account as just one more descriptivist failure. In this essay I have been concerned to defend an account of names that departs from Wittgenstein's in holding names to designate rigidly, but that I believe follows Wittgenstein in taking names to vary in content, in the manner of indexicals. A further respect in which my proposal follows Wittgenstein is in its construal of names as in a certain sense semantically open, often depending for their contents on the exercise of speaker discretion. In this, names differ from some (but far from all) canonical indexicals, by serving as communicational tools of a characteristically plastic kind. This plasticity is compatible with rigid designation, however, and improves the resilience of the direct reference theory, without in any way compromising its integrity

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### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> A term may be ambiguous relative to one set of uses with respect to which its literal content varies and yet monosemous relative to each of two or more proper subsets of that

set, with respect to which its literal content also varies. For example, ‘you’ is ambiguous relative to its singular and plural second-person uses taken together, but unambiguous relative to each set of uses (singular and plural) taken separately. Thus the claim that names are indexicals is compatible with the claim that they are ambiguous. However, as we shall see, the received view is it that names are *merely* ambiguous; i.e., that they are ambiguous but not indexical.

<sup>2</sup> Throughout I reserve the term ‘meaning’ and its cognates for a semantic value on the level of what Kaplan calls “character,” as opposed to “content” (I do not, however, identify meaning with Kaplanian character). Thus I say that, e.g., the term ‘I’ has the same meaning in various mouths, despite referring to different individuals (and expressing different contents) therein. It is because the first person pronoun has the particular meaning that it has that it refers to me when I utter it, and to you when you do.

<sup>3</sup> The preceding passages are quoted from Perry 1997.

<sup>4</sup> I do not endorse the identification of meaning with Kaplanian character, nor yet with David Braun’s “structured character” (see Braun 1994), although the latter seems to do a better job of approximating meaning than the former. (My reasons for withholding endorsement on these points will emerge to some extent further along; for the details, see Pelczar Forthcoming.)

<sup>5</sup> See Evans 1973.

<sup>6</sup> Evans 1973, 195–96. As it happens, Evans’s “imaginary case” has found a tragic correlate in reality, as a result of a recently discovered baby switch in a Virginia hospital.

<sup>7</sup> It is possible for multiple dubbings involving the same name to be in force, in a single context. In such cases, more local contextual factors must raise one of the competing dubbings to prominence, if the name is to succeed in referring. For example, two dubbings of a thing by the name ‘Bush’ are in force, relative to the following conversation:

- A: How long has Bush been governor of Texas?  
 B: Let’s see; he was elected to his first term in 1994, so that must make it five years that he’s been in office.  
 A: Is that all?  
 B: Well, he didn’t get into politics as early as his father.  
 A: What was Bush doing before he became President?  
 B: I think he was in the CIA or something.

Both a dubbing of the forty-first U.S. President ‘Bush’ and a dubbing of his son by the same name are in force relative to this conversation: A or B could truly say of both father and son that he is called ‘Bush.’ But at the outset of this conversation, the dubbing of the eldest son of the forty-first U.S. President by the name ‘Bush’ has prominence, whereas later in the conversation, it loses prominence in favor of the dubbing of the forty-first U.S. President by the same name. In this case, it is a conversational norm of truth-telling that is primarily responsible for raising one of the competing dubbings in force to prominence.

<sup>8</sup> Pelczar and Rainsbury 1998

<sup>9</sup> Of course it is a very primitive form of descriptivism that I am presenting here, but it does an adequate job of illustrating the point.

<sup>10</sup> Throughout I use ‘context’ as shorthand for ‘context of utterance’ or ‘context of use.’ In referring to what Kaplan and others refer to as ‘contexts (or, circumstances) of evaluation’, I use the term ‘evaluation point.’

<sup>11</sup> Here I am provisionally and uncritically adopting the standard account of the semantics of ‘here.’ (We shall find reason to criticize presently.)

<sup>12</sup> This is oversimplified, since it ignores the possibility of competing dubbings in force (see note 7). Also, it ignores complications created by empty names, which it would take too long to address here.

<sup>13</sup> I do not claim that this rule is adequate. In fact, it isn't, as we shall see further on. However, it will do for illustrative purposes.

<sup>14</sup> The points made here regarding 'this' and 'that' can easily be extended to other indexicals. Thus, for example, letting  $\iota$  range over the indexicals 'he' and 'she', we have the following rule [III]:

$$(\forall \iota, c) \mathcal{C}(\iota, c) = \{(x_1, x_2) : x_1 \text{ is an evaluation point \& } (x_2 = \text{the female that } c_A \text{ manifestly intends to discuss in uttering } \iota, \text{ if } \iota = \text{'she'}) \& (x_2 = \text{the male that } c_A \text{ manifestly intends to discuss in uttering } \iota, \text{ if } \iota = \text{'he'})\}.$$

The terms 'he' and 'she' stand in the same relation to [III] as that in which 'this' and 'that' stand to [II], and (e.g.) 'David' and 'Bill' to [I]. (Again, I do not claim complete adequacy for [III], using it only to illustrate my point.)

<sup>15</sup> One might try to get around the problem I indicate here by means of a finer individuation of contexts of use, such that the words 'this' and 'that' are uttered in different contexts, even within the sentence 'This is a knife, and that is a letter-opener.' I see no objection to mid-sentence shifts of context (*pace* Braun 1996). However, I also see no way of individuating contexts in the way suggested, other than by appeal to occurrences of 'this' and 'that', respectively. For instance, in specifying which of these subsentential contexts we are to evaluate the content of 'this' with respect to, it seems we must specify it as: the context in place at the time at which the speaker utters 'this'. So even if we follow this "fluid context" suggestion, there will still be work for a second occurrence of the bound variable  $\tau$ , in [II].

<sup>16</sup> For a taste of the complexities, see Pelczar and Rainsbury 1998.

<sup>17</sup> See Kaplan 1979. In fact Kaplan discusses only 'now', but it is clear he would give a similar account of 'here'.

<sup>18</sup> For the technical trappings, see Kaplan 1979, 73–75.

<sup>19</sup> It is fairly obvious that the complexities in the use of 'here' to express various contents are not to be explained by recourse to the notion *vagueness*. The hallmark of vagueness has to do with Sorites paradoxes, a vague expression being (roughly) one that can be used to generate such a paradox. But, while 'here' may be vague with respect to many uses, the vagueness it exhibits is not the same in every use. For example, consider an utterance of 'here' occurring in the sentence, 'They have terrapin soup here', as uttered in a restaurant. Whatever vagueness attaches to the term in this use is simply that of '(at) this restaurant.' By contrast, the vagueness of 'here' as it occurs in the sentence, 'I planted sorghum here last year' (uttered in a context in which 'here' refers to a particular field) appears to be that of '(in) this field'. The precise nature of the vagueness of 'here' in a given context therefore depends on what the term expresses therein; apparent differences in what it expresses cannot therefore be explained as stemming from some vagueness that it exhibits in every context. In addition, there are cases in which the content that 'here' expresses is not vague at all. Such seems to be the content that an astronomer would express who, having prefaced his lecture with a precise delineation of the region of outer space with which he is concerned (say the sphere having our galaxy's center of gravity as its geometrical center, and having a radius of one hundred light-years), later in the lecture uses 'here' to refer to that region.

<sup>20</sup> There are other ways of trying to corral the complexities pertaining to what 'here' variously expresses by appeal to pragmatics. For example, one might try to develop a semantics

for 'here' that assigned it a disjunctive content in each use, such that, e.g., in each use its content is taken to be a function from evaluation points to a series of spatial points and regions. Then the apparent possibility of using 'here' literally to express contents more specific than the disjunctive ones assigned to it by the proposed semantic function would be explained away as the result of applications of a Gricean maxim of Quality.

For example, if we are sitting in a restaurant perusing our menus, and I remark, "They have terrapin soup here", by 'here' it seems that I mean not just "(on) this planet, or (in) this country, or (in) this city, or (at) this restaurant, or (on) this table, or (by) my hand, or ..." but rather simply: "(at) this restaurant". In a use like this, then, 'here' seems to express something more specific than the proposed "disjunctive" theory allows for. It is at this point that proponents of such a theory would have to claim that our common uses of 'here' regularly flout the Gricean conversational maxim enjoining a speaker to make his contribution to the conversation as informative as the purposes of the exchange require, at the point at which he makes his contribution. (This maxim must not be confused with a maxim that would enjoin speakers to make their conversational contributions as informative as is compatible with the aims of the exchanges in which they are involved. The latter is not, as Green has shown, one that governs ordinary conversation (see Green 1995).)

But a little consideration reveals that it cannot in general be by violating this maxim that 'here' comes to convey a content more specific than the proposed disjunctive one. Let us return to the restaurant where we were perusing our menus. Suppose that, continuing a conversation we were engaged in as we sat down, you set down your menu and muse: "Is there anywhere you can get a bottle of good Meursault for under \$50?" Looking at the wine list, I respond: "In fact, you can get a bottle of good Meursault for under \$50 here." In this context, my use of 'here' appears to express the same content as I might have expressed by means of the phrase: '(at) this restaurant.' Yet the appeal to implicature cannot account for this appearance. For in this case, what 'here' would literally express even if it expressed only what the implicature account maintains that it literally expresses – roughly, the same as would be expressed in the same context by '(on) this planet, or (in) this country, or ... etc.' – it would still be as informative as our conversation required. Therefore my use of 'here' cannot implicate the "(at) this restaurant" content by violating the informativeness maxim. Since the content I communicate to you by means of 'here' is not on any construal less informative than our conversation requires, it must be that my use of that term does not merely pragmatically impart that content, but expresses it literally.

<sup>21</sup> See Reimer 1992.

<sup>22</sup> See Reimer 1992.

<sup>23</sup> A more detailed treatment of some of the issues I raise here can be found in Pelczar Forthcoming.

<sup>24</sup> A likely exception to this rule comes in the form of initial dubbings or baptisms.

<sup>25</sup> Again, see Reimer 1992.

<sup>26</sup> Perry himself discusses the importance of speakers' intentions in relation to a variety of indexicals (see Perry 1997b).

<sup>27</sup> Although I have focused on speakers' intentions in arguing for the essential underdetermination of contents for certain expressions, there are other factors that may also render an expression one whose contents are in the relevant sense underdetermined, in various contexts (for more on this, see Pelczar Forthcoming).

<sup>28</sup> For a fuller development of this kind of theory, see Kripke 1972, 71. Kripke discusses *Philosophical Investigations* §79 at Kripke 1972, 31.

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Department of Philosophy  
 University of Virginia  
 Charlottesville, VA 22903  
 U.S.A.  
 E-mail: pelczar@email.arizona.edu

