This is the first thing I ever published. I wrote it in college, as a starry-eyed Wittgensteinian. It’s not too embarrassing.
I argue that the problem of the many isn’t the deep metaphysical conundrum it has been made out to be, since we can solve it without undertaking any interesting metaphysical commitments.
I criticize a well-known argument in favor of the natural supervenience of the phenomenal on the physical (the “dancing qualia argument”) for drawing a stronger conclusion than its premises warrant. I’d like to say more about this topic someday, if I can find the time.
I argue that the “pessimistic induction” against scientific realism is self-defeating. Since the pessimistic induction is already known to commit a base rate fallacy, I don’t feel an urgent need to publish this piece.
The latest of a distinguished line of Analysis rejects.