Pelczar, Michael (1996) Kripke’s treatment of Philosophical Investigations §50, Philosophical Investigations 19(2), 159-163.

This is the first thing I ever published. I wrote it in college, as a starry-eyed Wittgensteinian. It’s not too embarrassing.

An unexciting solution to the problem of the many.

I argue that the problem of the many isn’t the deep metaphysical conundrum it has been made out to be, since we can solve it without undertaking any interesting metaphysical commitments.

Pelczar, Michael (2008) On an argument for functional invariance, Minds & Machines 18(3), 373-377.

I criticize a well-known argument in favor of the natural supervenience of the phenomenal on the physical (the “dancing qualia argument”) for drawing a stronger conclusion than its premises warrant. I’d like to say more about this topic someday, if I can find the time.

The suicidal induction.

I argue that the “pessimistic induction” against scientific realism is self-defeating. This little paper has attracted some of the nastiest referee comments I’ve ever received. I guess I didn’t realize it was such a sensitive subject. Anyway, since the pessimistic induction is already known to commit a base rate fallacy, I don’t feel an urgent need to publish this piece.

A paradox about phenomenal duration.

The latest of a distinguished line of Analysis rejects.